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The Productivity Enhancement Capital Investment (PECTI
program is a funding program administered by the Defense
Productivity Program Office (DPPO). The program was established
in 1979 to improve the capital stock of Department of Defense
activities. It is designed to enable managers to make timely
investments in equipment and facilities which increase outputs of
an organization in relationship to inputs.
The program has separate funding sources depending upon the
cost of investment. Projects costing less than $100K are
eligible for "fast payback, funds which are allocated by the
respective military departments. The departments evaluate
projects for investment criteria and dispense funds according to
available resources and productivity strategies. Funding may be
received within six months of a request.
Projects costing more than $100K are eligible for the
Productivity Investment Fund (PIF) which is administered by DPPO.
There is a competitive review of projects submitted by the
military departments and defense agencies prior to funding.
There is a two year time lag between submission and funding. r
The productivity program has been operational for eight
years and has been evaluated by GAO (1981, 1987), Whipple and
* LaPatra (1983), and Turke (1986). Most of these reports focused
on the fast payback portion of the PECI program and concluded
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PECI is a valuable contribution to DoD productivity improvement.
The present report examines the Productivity Investment Fund
from the viewpoint of participating organizations. Specific
interest is directed towards the program activities of document
preparation, project selection, fund obligation and
accountability, and alternative sources of funding. The purpose
of this research is to define and evaluate factors which
facilitate or impede full participation in the Productivity
Enhancing Capital Investment program.
2
Introduction
The research described below was conducted for the Defense
Productivity Program Office to examine the Productivity
Investment Fund from the viewpoint of program users. Specific
interest was directed toward documentation, project selection,
funding, obligation, accountability, and alternate sources of
productivity funds. Information was obtained from program
managers at headquarters, major command, and local activity
levels; over 40 interviews were conducted with both active and
inactive program users. Interviews were conducted through on-
site visits and by telephone. Activities participating in this
research are listed in Appendix A.
This report is organized into six chapters. The first
chapter is a general introduction to the development of
productivity enhancing investment programs in the Department of
Defense. The second through fourth chapters are descriptions and
analyses of the programs in the Departments of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. The fifth chapter summarizes and discusses the
findings of the study. The sixth chapter provides conclusions
and recommendations.
History of Productivity Enhancing Investment Programs
The US economy was at a critical juncture in 1970:
unemployment rose to six percent, a rate not seen in over 30
years; the Gross National Product showed no growth; imports
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totalled more than exports; and productivity became a major
concern of the business community and Congress. The Department
of Defense responded quickly to the challenge for increased
productivity within the Department of Defense. A productivity
program was established in August, 1973, under the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics with the
express purpose to:
- Promote productivity improvements at all levels of
responsibility throughout the Department.
- Foster the development and use of productivity
measurements.
- Establish a working environment giving full consideration
to meaningful and mature worker/manager relationships in
which both can fully participate and realize mutual
benefits.
In addition to focusing attention on productivity through
increased awareness, productivity measurement, and improved human
relations in the workplace, the Defense Department reemphasized
the use of capital investments to improve productivity. In
Fiscal Year 1973 the Army Materiel Command (AMC) experimented
with a capital investment program that made available a pool of
funds which could be drawn upon to purchase equipment without
requiring a lengthy approval process for each project. Within
the first six months of the program, over 60% of the projects had
paid back their investment costs. This successful test program
was the precursor of the fast payback programs which are
4
cornerstones of defense capital investment programs.
The appealing feature of the AMC test program for both
Congress and defense managers was the fast payback provision for
capital investments. In the normal procurement cycle there is a
two year time lag between the requirement for capital equipment
and the appropriation of funds for purchase. Fast payback
programs avoid this delay by enabling a manager to receive monies
as soon as two months after a request. Fast payback programs
made it possible to purchase equipment before it became outdated
through technological change. The ability of the buaget process
to contribute to productivity was obvious to all parties. In
1975 Congress gave approval to implement a productivity enhancing
capital investment program throughout DoD; Fiscal Year 1977 was
the first year of the program.
Productivity Enhancement Capital Investment Program
The Productivity Enhancement Capital Investment (PECI)
program that developed from the earlier experimental programs was
formally inaugurated in 1979 with DoD Directive 5010.31, 1979,
updated by DOD 5010.36, 31 Dec 8j. This directive establishes
that the main objective of PECI is to "provide for capital
investment in equipment and facilities which will increase
outputs of an organization in relationship to inputs." Specific
objectives are to:
1. Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of defense
organizations and activities by encouraging the application
of capital equipment and facilities to improve methods of
5
operation.
2. Increase the level of consciousness among defense managers
of the potential for productivity improvement through
capital investments.
3. Promote the substitution of capital for labor as a means of
optimizing the output of the defense work force.
Four different types of funds are available for PECI
projects, but provisions on some of the funds restrict their use:
1. Productivity Enhancing Incentive Funds (PEIF). This fund
was inaugurated in 1j77 to finance projects under $100,000
that have a minimum payback period of less than two years.
This is the original PECI fund and is often referred to as
the "Fast Payback Fund."
2. Productivity Investment Funds (PIP). This fund was created
in 1981 and provides a source of funds that are "fenced' by
OSD to finance competitively selected proposals of a more
expensive nature, i.e., greater than $100,000, that have
expected payback periods of four years or less.
0
3. Component Sponsored Investment Programs (CSIP). This fund
was initiated in 1981 and provides money to fund PECI's of
particular concern to the individual services.
4. Asset Capitalization Program (ACP). This program, started
in 1983, replaced the earlier Industrial Fund Fast Payback
(IFFP). Asset capitalization provides for financing of
capital investments by passing costs on to customers through
work surcharges. ACP is not considered part of the PECI
6
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program and in fact removes industrially funded activities
from using PECI funding for equipment purchases.
Industrially funded activities are permitted to use PIF
funds for facility construction funds so industrial
activities do maintain a nominal involvement in the PECI
program.
Whipple and LaPat-a (1983) note that PEIF and PIF programs
have great potential for improving productivity in the armed
services because of the complementary nature between the amount
of money ]equested and the length of reaction time between
request and approval. As stated above, PEIF funds are available
for projects costing less than $100,000. Money is drawn from a
pre-established "pool" set up by the Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD) at each of the component services to fund projects
which meet productivity criteria.
Productivity projects costing more than $100,000 are funded
with the Productivity Investment Fund, but the appropriation
process has a long reaction time. Service components submit
proposals to the Defense Productivity Program Office which
performs a competitive review of all projects against specific
criteria, e.g., amortization period, internal rate of return, and
net present value. Following successful review the proposals are
forwarded to Congress with notification to the component to
include the project as a line item for the following Fiscal Year
budget. Financing is appropriated from the productivity fund set




To summarize, PElF is a funding source which is immediately
available to purchase new technology but has a ceiling on
expenditures. PIF, on the other hand, does not limit the amount
which can be expended for productivity enhancing capital but has
a slow reaction time since projects become line items in the
normal appropriation cycle.
The complementary nature of PEIF and PIF can greatly assist
in the design of a capital investment program aimed at
productivity enhancement. Equipment which improves productivity
of individual employees can usually be purchased using PEIF,
while PIF can be applied towards projects which improve the
productivity of entire work units. With these funding tools the
defense manager can plan for both short-term and long-term
capital investments that increase unit efficiency by reducing
labor costs and, ultimately, manpower requirements. The
potential exists within the purview of these programs to
significantly impact productivity of the armed services (Whipple
and LaPatra, 1983).
Given the theoretical potential of the PECI program the
obvious question is whether the program structure actually
encourages capital investment. An integral feature of the PECI
program is a cost-benefit analysis that documents net costs,
sources of savings, and applications of savings for each
proposal. Essentially, savings must pay back investment costs




Savings are generated by either hard savings, cost-avoidance
savings, or opportunity trade-off savings. These types of
savings are defined as follows:
Hard Savings: benefits that can be precisely measured,
quantified, and placed under management control at the time
of realization. Hard savings normally are applied as
specific reductions in manpower and budget dollar
requirements.
Cost-Avoidance Savings: benefits from actions that obviate
the requirements for an increase in future levels of
manpower or costs that would be necessary if present
management practice were continued. The effect of cost-
avoidance savings is the achievement of a given level of
readiness at less staffing cost or the absorption of a
growing workload at the same level of staffing cost.
Opportunity Trade-Off Savings: benefits that occur as a
result of selecting the least-cost alternative from among
alternative choices. The savings occur by avoiding the loss
of an opportunity to enhance productivity and accrue
benefits by choosing one course of action over another.
The incentive of the PECI program is that productivity
savings remain within the command. Disposition of savings is
accomplished by either reapplying the savings within the program
element generating the proposal, reprogramming saved requirements
to other areas within the command, or reducing specific budget
requirements. As an example, when a piece of equipment
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purchased with PECI funds performs a job with fewer personnel,
"saved" personnel requirements can be reassigned within the
command.
The obvious benefit of the PECI program is that needed
equipment can be procured without using local resources, and the
savings can be reinvested in the local command. The negative
aspect of PECI is that proposals require extensive documentation
both during the initiation stage and after the equipment is
installed. Our data indicate that this justification places a
demand on resource managers that influences program usage. Cost-
benefit analyses are costly, time consuming, and often confusing
to persons unfamiliar with the procedures. Further, post
investment analyses require cooperation from equipment users who
tend to forget about reporting usage after the equipment is
installed. Thus, managers are faced with balancing the benefits
and costs of the PECI program against a selection process that is
very competitive, especially for PIF projects.
Typical PIF projects often cost millions of dollars, so it
is not unusual for up-front documentation costs to exceed
$10,000. These are sunk costs for both approved and non-approved
proposals, but when there is an indication that a project will
not be selected for funding there is a natural reluctance to
invest resources in the proposal process. There is stiff
competition among DoD Components for the Productivity Investment
Fund with certain components more successful in receiving funds.
Previous research (Turke, 1986) has indicated Army and Air Force
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have robust PECI programs while Navy participation has dwindled
in recent years. Other research indicates a wide variety of
factors can facilitate or impede program use, e.g., local
management practices (Marshall, 1985; Moe, 1985), organizational
mission (Badger, 1985), and alternate funding sources which
preclude PECI funding (Wolfe, 1985).
The Defense Productivity Program Office has expressed
interest in determining whether elements of PECI are unduly
influencing program involvement. Specifically, DPPO has tasked
the Naval Postgraduate School to research the impediments to PECI
participation by interviewing program managers at each component
level. Elements of concern are documentation, selection, fund
obligation, post investment analyses and alternate sources of
investment funds. The following chapters report the results from
program managers at headquarters, major commands and local




The Army manages PECI with three programs administered
through the Office of the Comptroller (DACA-RPM). The fast
payback fund is named Quick Return Investment Program (QRIP),
the component sponsored fund is named Productivity Enhancing
Component Investment Program (PECIP), and the Productivity
Investment Program is named OSD-PIF. The implementing regulation
is AR 5-4. Operationally, QRIP funds are pre-positioned at the
major commands (MACOMS) which approve the productivity requests
of their respective local activities and release funds on an as-
needed basis. PECIP is managed at Headquarters, Department of
the Army, where the Office of Comptroller evaluates and approves
capital investment for projects costing more than $100K, which
most likely would not favorably compete with other OSD-funded
productivity projects. Candidates for OSD-PIF funding also pass
through the Office of the Comptroller which reviews submissions
for completeness and forwards all proposals to the Defense
Productivity Program Office in the Office of Secretary of
Defense.
Without question Army is the most active participant in the
PIF program. In FY88-89, 229 projects were submitted to OSD
which represented a 50% increase over FY87. Approval was
received on 95 projects totalling $96.6M for FY88 and 54 projects
totalling $67.7M for FY89.
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With the Productivity Enhancement program located in the
Office of the Comptroller there is a high level of visibility and
good communication channels between Headquarters, MACOMS, and
local activities. The project director at headquarters consults
frequently with requestors about pending OSD-PIF proposals and,
consequently, is well-known throughout the Army. The Comptroller
also takes responsibility for training personnel about PECI
procedures and cost-benefit analysis and informs MACOMs about
impending due dates; the whole process flows smoothly.
The centralization of Army's program and the smooth working
relationship between Headquarters and the MACOMs is probably a
central reason for Army's success in obtaining PIF approvals.
According to the project director, PECI was "sold" to the
commands in the first years of the program with a subsequent
"snowball" effect that has resulted in increasing submissions
over the past five years. The program has increased on the
average of 30% per fiscal year from FY82 to FY88.
The selection process, detailed in AR 5-4, emphasizes hard
savings and cost avoidance. Projects are ranked at headquarters
on three dimensions: internal rate of return (IRR), saving to
investment ratio (SIR) and rate of investment per manpower space
(RIMS). A composite rank is formed from the three rankings.
Special consideration is given to projects "improving readiness
and 'freeing up' manpower spaces." The proposals are sent on to
OSD in both hard copy and computer diskette form.
The proposals submitted by Army in 1987 fill volumes. The
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number and success rate of Army proposals indicate a vigorous
capital investment program is operating at headquarters. The
ironic consequence of this is that the volume is so great that
DPPO's resources are strained trying to process Army proposals.
Turke (1986) has recommended that Army adopt OSD's ranking
criteria to facilitate processing Army proposals, but some major
commands disagree about changing procedures. Army regulations
require post-investment analysis (PIA) not later than six months
after the actual operational date; this requirement has been
relaxed recently to one year. Unforeseen operational delays must
be explained to DACA-RPM. Only one PIA is required; however, an
audit trail must be maintained for one complete fiscal year
beyond amortization.
The information required for post-investment analysis does
not reflect actual productivity savings. Users report operating
costs before investment and after investment on the same
documentation forms used to request OSD-PIF funding. The PIA is
often a photocopy of the original requesting documentation rather
than an accounting of actual savings generated by the investment.
It is impossible to determine whether the investment meets
original saving projections. The data simply are not available.
Major Command: Army Materiel Command (AMC)
The Army Materiel Command (AMC) is the most active user of
the PECI program. AMC has a historical familiarity with PECI
since they initially tested the feasibility of a fast payback
program in 1974. The program is run on a timetable that is a
14
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model of efficiency. Local commands are notified well in advance
of deadlines to examine their requirements and apply for OSD-PIF
funds. In FY87 AMC had 47 OSD-PIF submissions; in FY88-89 they
submitted 125 proposals. The packages were well-documented and
arrived on time at headquarters.
AMC has automated their PECI program so they are able to
monitor the status of all projects. Suspense files are
maintained for obligation of funds and for post-investment
analyses. By tracking obligations AMC knows how much money has
been expended on a project and what monies can be called back.
In general AMC manages the PECI-PIF program so that it works for
the user and for headquarters.
AMC had its highest first quarter obligation rate of 25% in
FY86 which is a significant improvement over a 2% first quarter
rate in FY85. This rate was accomplished by instructing field
activities to begin their contracting of approved capital
investment projects after program budget decisions (PBD) had been
received from OSD but before Congressional approval. Contract
negotiations are conducted "subject to final award," which means
that there is a risk the funds may be withdrawn. The AMC has
experienced problems with this practice, however, because
Congress often does not approve full funding for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE) projects which are
probably the most common in AMC. In the past, short-falls have
been covered by redirecting funds from QRIP and PECIP. In FY87,
however, Congress reduced AMC's program budget decision from $39M
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to $9M. This $20M differential has forced AMC into a policy of
eliminating some projects to cover the $20M differential. The
overall effect of unstable funding on PECI activity is uncertain
at this time.
Local Activity: Laboratory Command. Laboratory Command
(LABCOM), a sub-command of AMC, is the single most active
participant in the entire PIF program. In 1981 Army Labs were
exempted from Industrial Fund requirements which allowed them to
compete for OSD-PIF funds. Since that time LABCOM has used OSD-
PIF monies to completely modernize laboratory facilities. In
FY87 LArCOM submitted 29 projects totalling $44M and 52 projects
for FY88 totalling $54M. According to LABCOM personnel OSD-PIF
has played a significant role in the upgrade in quality of LABCOM
facilities and their ability to attract high caliber scientists.
One reason for LABCOM's success is the enthusiasm of the
local management resource team for OSD-PIF. They actively
solicit RDTE requests and then prepare all documentation. The
program is well known in LABCOM both for its potential to provide
equipment and the skill of the management team in justifying
requests.
Savings are usually justified as a reduction in costs
charged to the customer. Savings are documented comparing the
"Old Way with the New Way" of providing the service. LABCOM also
pre-obligates in the sense that activities are instructed to
• begin contracting subject to final award.
Major Command: Finance and Accounting Center, Fort Benjamin
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Harrison, IN
The Finance and Accounting Center (FAC) uses QRIP and PECIP
to fund PECI projects, but does not submit a OSD-PIF proposal.
Most projects are not costly enough to satisfy OSD-PIF
requirements, but PECIP is also perceived as providing funds more
quickly than OSD-PIF.
The user prepares all documentation, while the management
resource team insures the proposals are properly documented.
Finance and Accounting Center has a one-year post-investment
analysis requirement, and savings are generally applied against
unfunded requirements or cost reduction. There is a general
avoidance of the use of PECI funds if the savings may result in a
loss of billets.
Major Command: Forces Command (FORSCOM)
Forces Command (FORSCOM) submitted 37 PIF projects to OSD in
FY88 and FY89 for a total of $42M. Almost 80% of the projects
were approved with most funding earmarked for office automation
projects. A sizable amount of money was also budgeted for "state
of the art" investments such as flight training systems, video
teleconferencing, and communication systems. A large MILCON
project for a Helicopter Refueling Facility has also been
approved.
FORSCOM is very positive about OSD-PIF. They have only
limited Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funds and view OSD-PIF as a
relatively stable funding source for investment projects.
FORSCOM reorganized the program in FY86 to emphasize the command
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benefits of productivity investment, and this generated
considerable program interest. PIF proposals increased from four
in FY87 to 37 in FY88, an 825% increase.
FORSCOM has designed program management to facilitate local
usage. Management resource teams work closely with requestors to
simplify the documentation. A handbook was distributed to local
resource managers which provides block by block details for
completing paperwork along with the rationale for the required
information. In addition to an aid this is a good training tool.
Also, to facilitate involvement, savings are reprogrammed at the
lowest possible level in the command so that requestors
experience the benefits of the program and are motivated towards
continued use.
Contracting is initiated by FORSCOM only after funding
authorization is received via a cite number. Activities submit a
post-investment analysis one year following installation. Travel
budget permitting, Forces Command has plans for field reviews of
local project installations and PIA. Most savings are applied
against work-year equivalents, but there are also hard savings
generated by lease buy-outs, cost reductions and space
reductions.
Local Activity: Fort Lewis, Washington. Fort Lewis has
been successful with OSD-PIF submissions in FY86 and FY87
although none of their FY88-89 projects were approved. Past
successes include recirculating water pumps which retard the
deterioration of hot water boilers and warehouse modernization
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devices which reduce energy loss. Paybacks are often achieved
within the first quarter after installation.
Documentation is generally prepared by the user with the
management resource team serving as consultants. Three-quarters
of the projects originate in the engineering division which
experiences no difficulty with documentation. Some projects are
assigned to interns as a practicum.
Obligation has been a problem at times. Fort Lewis found it
necessary to turn back a $180K project because they could not
obligate funds before the end of the fiscal year.
Accountability is accomplished with a one year PIA mailed to
FORSCOM. It consists of a comparison of "New Method vs. Old
Method of Operations," but there is no documented check on actual
equipment usage. Hard savings are often reported because of
energy reduction; other savings are realized through reduction in
man-year equivalents. One problem with the accountability
process is that it is often difficult to collect information from
the user because of a tendency to ignore reporting requirements
after the project is installed.
Major Command: Hospital Service Command, San Antonio, TX
Hospital Service Command (HSC) is an active user of QRIP but
submitted only one OSD-PIF project in FY88-89. The lack of
involvement with PIF stems from HSC's medical mission which
requires equipment that primarily addresses patient medical needs
rather than command productivity needs. Thus, HSC often
purchases very expensive medical equipment that improves surgical
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procedures but will not have a payback schedule that meets OSD
criteria. In general mission requirements do not permit
favorable PIF competition.
HSC does use QRIP to fund desktop computers and other
administrative equipment. There is a 45 day turn around for QRIP
funds, and savings are usually applied against multiple man-year
equivalents.
Local Activity: Blood Bank, Fort Ord, CA. The single OSD-
PIF project in HSC originated at Ft. Ord. It is an innovative
system to coordinate regional blood supply at three inter-service
hospitals (Silas B. Hayes, Ft. Ord; David Grant, Travis AFB; and
Oakland Naval Hospital). Savings are realized as a cost
reduction in the purchase of blood supplies from public blood
banks; savings are considerable. The impetus for this project
was a single individual who prepared all documentation and
lobbied for the project. Without doubt this individual's
motivation accounts for the approval of this project.
Documentation was prepared by the user in this case with
consultation from HSC; the local Controller provided little
assistance. It is estimated that over 300 hours of personal
time went into the preparation of this project. Since the
project has only been approved for FY88 funding no information is
available about obligations or accountability.
Major Command: Training and Doctrination Command (TRADOC)
Training and Doctrination Command (TRADOC) maintains an




activities are tasked yearly with specific productivity goals.
The activity with the highe t amount of savings is awarded a $1
million dollar bonrs which is added to the winning command's
budget. The award, officially known as Systematic Productivity
Improvement Review in TRADOC (SPIRIT), is a powerful incentive;
in FY85 TRADOC was first in the Army in productivity gains.
Local commands use all of the PECI programs to achieve their
SPIRIT goals. TRADOC has funded over 250 PECI projects although
only two OSD-PIF were funded in FY88-89. As a general policy for
projects costing more than $100K, PECIP is used to fund automatic
data processing projects, while mili.dry construction projects
are targeted for OSD-PIF.
TRADOC has submitted few OSD-PIF projects in the past few
years. Only four proposals were submitted for FY88-89. This
selective participation is due to the perception that OSD-PIF is
too competitive for most TRADOC projects. Many have low savings
to earnings ratios (SIR) which meet minimum requirements but fall
below historical OSD requirements. Resource managers tend to use 3
PECIP to fund projects costing more than $100K. There is an
informal cut-off so that projects between $100K and $250K are
submitted under PECIP while larger projects enter as OSD-PIF.
Post-investment analyses (PIA) are performed yearly to
qualify for the end-of-year SPIRIT report. QRIP and PECIP are
monitored at the local level while TRADOC audits PIF projects.
Savings are usually applied against unfunded requirements,




backlog. Hard savings accrue through lease buy-outs and utility
conservation.
Local Activity: Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis, IN.
TRADOC at Fort Benjamin Harrison is responsible for Adjutant
General schooling. While most of the PECI projects involve QRIP
there are two OSD-PIF projects in the works: a warehouse costing
$2M and a consolidation of teaching facilities costing $1M. Both
projects are justified by cost reduction.
The management resource team is determined to meet TRADOC
SPIRIT goals, even though there is limited command support. The
team does an up-front marketing job and tries to teach managers
to think about future needs. The team works closely with the
user and prepares the documentation. On the average it takes 60
days to complete paperwork on projects costing over $100K.
OSD-PIF is selected as the funding source when the project's
payback period is less than 32-36 months and the savings to
investment ratio is less than 10. Otherwise PECIP is used for
projects costing less than $250K.
The resource team for TRADOC at Ft. Harrison has stringent
internal controls. They require monthly accounting starting 90
days after installation for all PECI projects, QRIP, PECIP and
OSD-PIF. Savings on QRIP and PECIP are reported to TRADOC at the
end of the FY. A post-investment analysis is performed on OSD-
PIF projects one year after installation. All PECI savings
qualify for the SPIRIT award.
Local Activity: Fort Lewis, Washington. TRADOC at Fort
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Lewis is involved with Reserve Training. Participation in PECI
is limited to QRIP with no OSD-PIF. Current projects include a
software package for desktop computer training. Savings are
justified as a cost reduction from off-site training. The
resource manager assists users with documentation and prepares
the one year PIA. Accountability relies on the same
documentation submitted to justify the proposal, and the internal
review of actual usage tends to be informal.
This activity was an early user of QRIP, using the fund to
purchase graphic printing devices. One user observed the current
documentation is less cumbersome than before but plans to
purchase peripheral equipment using funds available through Army
Defense Engineering Agency (ADEA). This individual stated ADEA
has ample resources, few requirements and a user-friendly
contracting office. The relative ease of obtaining and
obligating ADEA funds was far more attractive than QRIP.
Major Command: Western Command (WESCOM)
WESCOM has had only moderate success in receiving funding
for OSD-PIF projects. Prior to FY88-89 WESCOM had only one
project approved of seven submissions. In FY88-89 two projects
have received approval. The resource manager states the reason
for the low approval rate is that the projects have a low Return
on Investment (ROI) and that savings are difficult to determine
because the readiness arena is not amenable to measurement.
Savings are generally justified as cost reduction against lease
buy-outs and partial manpower reduction. WESCOM's one funded
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project has not yet been procured so OSD-PIF accountability
practices have not been tested.
2
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NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
In the Navy, program responsibility for productivity
enhancing capital investment resides with the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics !ASN,S&L). Program
management is shared by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Navy
Comptroller (NAVCOMP). NAVCOMP is responsible for financial
management while adinistrative management is assigned to Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), also known as OP-04. The
Navy productivity funds are known as Productivity Enhancing
Incentive Fund (PEIF) for fast payback and Productivity
Investment Fund (PIF) for OSD funded projects costing more than
$100K. The component sponsored investment fund is known as Cost
of Ownership Reduction Investment (COORI); no funds have been
expended under COORI since FY 1983.
Navy's participation in PIF has resulted in some innovative
technology, but the record for Other Procurement or military
construction is undistinguished compared to the other military
departments. Program awareness of PECI is confined to a few
personnel in comptroller and supply functions, and only the fast
payback portion of the program is fully implemented by Navy
instructions. Finally, post investment analyses are few in
number because many projects have not been operational for the
requisite time period prior to analysis.
Historically, Navy was slow to implement PECI. GAO singled
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out Navy in a 1981 report for a lack of enthusiasm regarding the
program and recommended that the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
request no further PEIF funds until an action plan was developed
to impruve program maihdgement. Shortly Lhereafter SECNAV issued
SECNAVINST 5200.31A, dated June 1981, since superceded by SECNAV-
INST 5200.31B, dated July 1984. The instruction was intended "to
provide policy and guidance and assign responsibilities for the
development, implementation, and administration of the (DON)
Productivity Improvement Program."
Navy regulations are inadequate to implement the PECI
program. SECNAV instructions had been supplemented by Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) Instructions 5200.42B and 5200.45 which
provided specific guidance for the productivity enhancement
program. Since NAVMAT was decommissioned in 1985 no replacement
guidelines have been published, so there is no formal direction
to the Navy's PECI program. To complicate matters further the
only regulation which defines post-investment analysis
requirements is NAVCOMPINST 7000.38A, which covers only the fast
payback, or PEIF, portion of PECI and does not include PIF or
COORI. Overall, formal Navy management of the PECI program is
spotty; existing regulations are too general or incomplete and
specific guidelines are no longer in effect.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics)
The predominant perception of PECI at ASN(S&L) is that the
program does not meet Navy needs for industrial productivity and
is difficult to administer. At the user level program managers
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at ASN stated that local commanders lack interest in the PECI
program because local managers are motivated towards the
replacement of worn parts rather than investment in productivity
enhancing equipment. Under this scenario commanders perceive
investment projects as taking too long before improvement occurs
and consequently are reluctant to expend resources for projects
that will not mature before their tour of duty is completed.
At the command level, ASN(S&L) personnel expressed concern
that NAVCOMP places too many controls on the PECI program which
cool local interest. For instance, NAVCOMP requires obligation
schedules for PIF projects even before proposals are sent to OSD.
Also projects which have received funding have seen NAVCOMP
reprogram or withhold productivity funds depending on operational
requirements. These actions tend to subvert the intention of
productivity investment so the program stagnates.
ASN(S&L) personnel acknowledge that PIF program management
needs improvement, and they have taken steps to correct the
situation. The program is beginning to receive high level
visibility and there is an effort to coordinate the process
between OP-04J and NAVCOMP.
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (OP-04J)
The productivity investment fund is administered by OP-04J.
This office operates as a program intermediary between the
Systems Commands (SYSCOMS) which request funds and the Navy
I
Comptroller (NAVCOMP), which charges projects against Navy
requirements and delivers funds. In OP-04 management of the PIF
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program is a collateral duty where the primary function is to
ensure that projects are complete with properly prepared
paperwork. Projects are ranked according to financial criteria
and then sent on to NAVCOMP which may rerank the proposals before
Navy's PIF projects are sent onto OSD. OP-04J does not decide
which projects will be sent to DoD.
The biggest problem for OP-04J is the tardiness of many
projects. In FY88 19% of Navy's PIF submissions were received
after the 1 June cut-off date and there was considerable last-
minute effort readying the Navy package for OSD.
Most Navy PIF projects are justified as cost reductions;
when manpower savings are identified, they are applied against
deferred requirements.
OP-04J does not require post investment analyses (PIAs)
since accountability is a NAVCOMP responsibility. In actuality
no PIA's have been performed in the Navy because no PIF projects
have been installed for the requisite two years prior to a PIA
audit.
The Navy has low obligation rates of Productivity Investment
Funds. In mid fiscal year 1987 only 37% of FY85 and 30% of FY86
funds had been obligated and only 35% of 1985 and 15% of FY86
projects had funds obligated. Additionally, since NAVCOMP
reprogrammed the PIF monies of FY84 for another purpose, funds
for FY84 were still being obligated as late as FY86. The
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics
has taken an active interest in these low obligation rates and
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has required quarterly status reports on PIF obligations. It is
considered likely that ASN interest will greatly improve both
obligation rates and progress participation.
Navy Comptroller
The Navy Comptroller checks PIF projects prior to submission
to OSD to ensure projects satisfy both DOD criteria and Navy
requirements. The review makes sure that the correct
appropriation fund is requested and that duplication of equipment
is avoided. In general the feeling at NAVCOMP is that the Navy
does not have a productivity program. There has been no
direction and there has been no documentation of savings. It is
anticipated that changes at ASN(S&L) should remeay deficiencies.
Major Command: Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
NAVAIR is the most active SYSCOM in the Navy PIF program.
In part this is because some personnel moved to NAVAIR from
NAVMAT after it was decommissioned, although NAVAIR has always
been the Navy's primary user of PIF.
NAVAIR differs from other users by using PIF funds in
activities that normally use only Asset Capitalization Program
(ACP) funds. That is, NAVAIR uses ACP to maintain capability,
but uses PIF to increase capability. This policy has resulted in
some exceptional projects that essentially reconfigure off-the-
shelf equipment to develop new machines that increase
manufacturing capacity.
Projects are requested during an annual data call in May.
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NAVAIR ranks projects by payback period with most justification
provided by cost avoidance. Projects are forwarded to OPNAV
before 30 June. No projects have been operational for a
sufficient period of time to initiate PIAs.
Local Activity: Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island,
CA. NADEP, North Island has one of the more impressive PIF
projects, but it is not operational even though it was funded
over six years ago at a cost of $7M. This piece of equipment is
an experiment in robotics. According to the project manager it
was conceived during the early days of PIF, but has lost the
interest of middle management. It has also lost its primary
mission since the aircraft on which it was designed to work are
being phased-out so the equipment may be domiciled at another
activity.
Local Activity: Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Cherry Point,
NC. NADEP, Cherry Point has a strong commitment to productivity
and uses the Productivity Investment Fund in conjunction with
other programs to meet mission objectives. The policy is to use
PIF in situations where Manufacturing Technology Funds (MANTECH)
or ACP are not appropriate. This occurs when an investment falls
between equipment on the cutting edge of technology (MANTECH) and
off-the-shelf items (ACP). When production savings can be
generated by a large project, then productivity investment funds
are sought.
PIF has funded some rework projects which repair previously
scrapped parts, with large cost reduction savings. Also
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equipment that greatly reduces inspection time for reworking
aircraft has been purchased with PIF. However, mission
requirements sometimes change after submission of a project so
productivity gains are not realized on all projects. Hence, it
is difficult to judge the long-term effects of the productivity
investment.
Major Command. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
The general impression at NAVSEA is that the PECI program is
poorly administered. There are memories that funding was
sufficient in FY81 and 82 but became unreliable in FY84 with the
ACP program. The concern is that when funds are unreliable the
overhead expense of preparing documentation is not justified.
Further, there is a sense the money is unprotected and is subject
to political pressures and budget cuts.
The perception at NAVSEA is that the PECI program is a band-
aid solution to the larger issues of productivity. Documentation
requires too much time for the relative gain of PIF and only
small projects can be programmed through ACP because customers
cannot shoulder the additional burdens that would be forced on
them to finance the large investments required to improve
productivity. In sum, NAVSEA is of the opinion that productivity
is achieved with large projects such as additional drydocks
costing $25-30 million. When large projects were submitted in
the past, they were turned back because of insufficient economic
analysis. Consequently, NAVSEA has concluded OSD's commitment to
productivity is shallow, the PIF program has little relevance to
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NAVSEA's mission, and the unreliability of OSD funding does not
justify the overhead costs of project justification.
Major Command: Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC)
Most activities within the Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC)
are industrially-funded and tend to rely upon the Asset
Capitalization Program for investment funding; however NAVFAC had
experience with the Productivity Investment Fund in FY 1984 and
finds fault with both program structure and management. The
criticism is generally directed at Navy management although there
is an overall complaint that the PIF budget cycle is not
coordinated with the budgeting cycles of the Program Objective
Memoranda (POM). Thus, a project which is not selected for
Productivity Investment Funds during a certain fiscal year must
wait an additional year for inclusion in the next POM. In an
environment where technology already outpaces funding, waiting
for an additional 12-month period tends to subvert the goals of
productivity. By the time funds are appropriated the investment
may be overcome by new technology.
NAVFAC has experienced problems with the PIF. In
particular, NAVFAC personnel are of the opinion that CNO rejects
the shore-based projects which are the trademark of NAVFAC in
favor of fleet projects, and when a project such as overseas
military construction is passed by CNO it is cut by Congress for
political reasons.
The uncertainty of the selection process is compounded by
unstable funding by the Navy Comptroller. Productivity funds
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have been diverted in the past to satisfy other requirements
which has left the distinct impression that productivity funds
are the first to go when resources are tight. The consequence is
that when activities do not see the results of productivity
requests they do not bother with the necessary paperwork. This
distress has been exacerbated with the Navy Comptroller's
requirement for quarterly reports on the obligation of
productivity funds. The costs simply outweigh the benefits.
Major Command: Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Pearl Harbor, HI
Among Navy operational activities the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)
is an active participant in productivity enhancing capital
investment using both the PEIF and PIF programs. There have been
few problems with PEIF but PIF funding was unstable during FY84
which affected program interest. In the past, investments which
had been approved by CNO and OSD for productivity investment
funds would ultimately receive funding through other sources,
e.g., OPN, because the PIF funding was erratic. Again, this
funding instability has been attributed to some practices of the
Navy Comptroller which are no longer followed. In general the
PIF process now appears on track. The number of PACFLT projects
selected for funding has increased, and funds are received in a
timely fashion. PACFLT has had twice as many projects selected
for funding in FY86 and FY87 as in FY84 or FY85 even though the
total number of PACFLT proposals declined by 50% between FY84 and
FY86.
Local Activity: Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
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(SIMA), San Diego, CA. This activity has had negative
experiences with the PIF program and generally questions the
usefulness of the program as currently administered. Two PIF
projects were submitted for FY85 and FY86. The project for FY85
became lost in the system and had to be resubmitted in FY86,
while the FY86 project was approved but funding was not received
until FY87.
Personnel responsible for documentation have had no formal
training in cost-benefit analysis and find the paperwork
intimidating. They express a need for clear guidelines.
Finally, funds available from other sources are considerably less
encumbered and more reliable than productivity investment funds.
Measured against these negative experiences, this activity
continues to submit PIF projects with an attitude of hopeful
pessimism.
Local Activity: Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, CA. The
Productivity Investment Fund is not widely used at the Alameda
Naval Air Station for two reasons. First, the operating budget
precludes projects costing more than $100K. Secondly, program
knowledge is limited to a few individuals in the Comptroller and
Supply functions. These knowledgeable persons think the program
is excellent but is often forgotten as an investment resource.
Further, most local personnel were unable to perform the
analyses. NAS Alameda did submit one PIF project for FY88 which
passed the Navy selection process but was not approved by OSD.
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Marine Corps
There is not a great deal of use of PECI by the Marine
Corps, but when PECI funds are expended the program is managed in
textbook fashion. The PECI program is administered through the
Commandant Marine Corps (CMC) with financial manaqement provided
by NAVCOMP.
The USMC has a high success ratio with PIF projects for two
reasons. First, they seldom request PECI funds. Secondly,
NAVCOMP and OSD generally accommodate Marine Corps requests.
One notable feature of USMC management of PECI is the
accountability process. Audits begin six months following
installation and continue until payback is satisfied. There is
a determined effort to meet the payback target; consequently, if
equipment is underutilized the situation is immediately corrected
and monitored until payback is achieved.
Local Activity: Marine Corps Air Station, Kneohe Bay, HI.
This activity has been the most active USMC participant in the
PECI program, although there have been no PIF projects. All
equipment requests are matched against PECI criteria for
applicability.
Interest in PECI has cooled since FY84, hcwever, since it
has been difficult to account for manhour savings of military
personnel. PECI requests had been justified against military
manpower assigned to temporary duty, but CMC ordered that billet
reductions must be demonstrated. The base situation did not
allow for billet reduction because of the high number of
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temporary personnel, so interest in PECI has tailed off. On the
other hand projects justified through cost reductions have fared
very well but are few in number.
As indicated above, internal review procedures are very






The Air Force has placed primary responsibility for the PECI
program with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Financial Management. The Deputy Assistant for Management
Systems is designated as Productivity Principal. Operationally,
PECI is administered by the Directorate for Manpower and
Organization (MPMZ) at Headquarters, Air Force. The governing
regulation is Air Force Regulation (AFR) 25-3 which has been
under revision for the past three years.
Air Force has a balanced application of PECI programs. The
PIF program and CSIP are administered at Air Staff while the fast
payback program, known as FASCAP, is administered by Air Force
Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA), Randolph AFB. In general
there is differential usage of the PECI programs by the different
Major Commands (MAJCOMS). Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and
Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) are consistently the most active
S
users of PIF program, while Strategic Air Command (SAC) and
Military Airlift Command (MAC) tend to use FASCAP for
productivity investments. In FY 88-89 Tactical Air Command (TAC)
was more active than in previous years accounting for 16% of Air
Force PIF projects submitted to OSD.
Air Staff has an assiduous review process of PIF projects.
Projects must first meet the qualifications for DoD 5010.36 and




budget. Worthy projects which do not satisfy OSD criteria are
selected for CSIP funding at this stage. Air Staff makes a
determined effort to achieve hard savings. The general
philosophy is that hard savings have a more beneficial near-term
effect. Thus, PIF submissions with hard savings are double
weighted during Air Staff review. The total package submitted to
OSD contains a mixture of hard and soft savings.
Air Staff usually submits a number of Military Construction
(MILCON) projects for PIF monies. MILCON projects are usually
more costly and have a longer life cycle than other projects,
consequently life cycle savings are much higher. This results in
higher rankings for MILCON projects. The negative effect is that
the budget is exhausted more rapidly, so that equally valuable
PIF projects are by-passed.
The manpower directorate responsible for productivity
capital investment keeps a close watch on manpower savings.
Projects justified by manpower savings are audited following
installation. The recipient is decremented the appropriate
manpower savings which are then reapplied within the command.
These auditing practices result in a perception that productivity
enhancement projects result in a loss of personnel, but in
practice savings are applied against unfunded requirements so
that actual loss of manpower is seldom realized.
Purchasing and acquisition (P&A) procedures within the Air
Force tend to result in low obligation rates. First, Air Staff S
does not permit contracting to begin prior to receipt of monies.
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Secondly, new purchases must have an equipment authorization
number. However, PECI equipment purchases do not have a number
because the equipment is new to the inventory. Consequently six
to 12 months can pass between funding authorization and
obligations waiting for a stock number. It is generally conceded
that P&A procedures account for the most significant bottleneck
in the PECI program.
Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA),
Randolph AFB, San Antonio, TX
The Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA) manages
the Fast Capitalization (FASCAP) program with an ease and
sophistication that is appreciated by all participants. They
dispensed $10 million in FY86 and $12 million in FY87. There is
so much interest in FASCAP that the FY87 monies were already
expended by February of 1987. The FASCAP program is highly
visible in the Major Commands (MAJCOMS). AFMEA sponsors yearly
conferences about FASCAP and also schedules regular learning
sessions for operational personnel.
Procedurally, AFMEA prepositions money at each of the
MAJCOMs. When FASCAP projects are approved the MAJCOM is
authorized to commit money to the project. If a command shows
low activity with FASCAP the monies are simply shifted to more
active commands. This seems to stimulate interest in the
program. In an 18 month period one MAC base submitted 40
projects for more than $1.5M.
AFMEA performs a single project analysis in 4 1/2 days.
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Submissions are evaluated against manpower or cost savings which
are documented historically. Partly because of the streamlined
review process 30% of FASCAP projects are operational within 6
months and 60% within 18 months.
In the past FASCAP monies have been invested in office
automation, especially the purchase of desktop computers.
Recently, attention has shifted to other areas, e.g., investments
in medical equipment. The current funding breakdown for FY 1987
shows that Personnel and Administration received 32% of FASCAP
funds, Medical 28%, and Supply, Transportation, and Military
Police a combined total of 40%.
AFMEA keeps close track of FASCAP projects. Information is
maintained in a data base which is used to track reporting dates
for fund obligation, post-investment analysis (PIA), and
amortization. PIA is required six months after installation with
six month follow- on reports until the project amortizes.
When payback is attained the receiving command is
decremented the appropriate manpower requirements; consequently
S
AFMEA is sometimes perceived as "black hats." This perception
does not limit program activity, however, since the opportunity
to purchase equipment without using procurement (3080) or
operating (3010) funds is very appealing to the MAJCOMs. AFMEA
manages the FASCAP program with tangible results, the program
appears to be appreciated throughout the Air Force.
Major Command: Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
AFSC is an active participant in the Productivity Investment
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Fund program. In FY 88-89 five of seven projects were approved
by OSD for a total of $24.8 million; AFSC was second behind AFLC
for total dollar amount in submissions and approvals.
Part of AFSC's high success rate can be attributed to the
expertise at Headquarters, AFSC. Individuals who manage the
program have been responsible for the revision of AF Regulation
25-3; they are aware of the purpose of the program and manage it
accordingly.
AFSC promotes the PIF program from the command level through
close coordination with Management Engineering Teams kMET) at the
local activities. Suggestions for capital investments are
solicited and coordinated at the local level, and economic
analysis is certified by the local comptroller. It is
acknowledged that PIF documentation involves considerable effort,
but it is perceived as no more demanding than normal budgeting
for the POM and has become easier over the years. The average
PIF project takes 30 months from initiation to installation.
The projects that AFSC selects for Air Staff consideration
rely on proven technology and avoid risk taking. AFSC favors the
replication of successful prototypes. AFSC bases project
selection on IRR and projected savings. In FY88-89 they
submitted two MILCON and 5 equipment projects; both MILCON
projects were approved.
The biggest funding problem for AFSC is a traditional
reduction of RDTE funds by Congress; usually OSD approved RDTE
projects are reduced by 50%. Resource managers at AFSC must then
41
|*
decide which projects to fund. Often the strategy is to cancel a
single project so that resources can be spread across other
projects. This results in some difficult decisions.
Obligation rates are low, but this tends to be a function of
the type of purchases involved in PIF projects. PIF projects
often reconfigure off-the-shelf technology to satisfy specific
needs. Negotiations on specifications alone can take over two
years. Further, AFSC will not pre-commit funds based on past
experience with Congressional reductions. Consequently, fund
obligation takes much longer than the normal procurement process.
Major Command: Air Force Communications Command (AFCC)
Air Force Communications Command uses the PIF program as a
last resort for the procurement of high cost equipment. The
general objection at AFCC is that program documentation is
formidable and outweighs program benefits. The staff is
relatively inexperienced with the Productivity Investment Fund
and the program is one of many duties, so they feel overwhelmed
by the documentation requirements. The staff briefs PIF
participants on how to prepare cost-benefit justification but
there are still many rewrites. There is hope the new AFR 25-3
will provide guidance for the documentation. In all the PIF
program is perceived as demanding considerable paperwork for
limited gain.
In FY88-89 AFCC submitted 8 PIF projects anticipating
approval of three to four projects. Ultimately only one project
was approved by OSD for a total of $4.1 million. When compared
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with the quickness and convenience of FASCAP, PIF is held in low
regard by AFCC.
Major Command: Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)
Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) is the most active AF
Major Command in the PIF program. For FY 88-b9 AFLC submitted
projects totalling $72.7 million of which $56.6 million were
approved by OSD. The largest amounts were awarded for MILCON
projects; four of five projects were funded for $55.3 million.
Out of the total AFLC package 99% of the funding was directed to
4 MILCON projects. PIF MILCON projects are important to AFLC
because the funding is seen as a resource that frees up other
MILCON funds.
The initiative to pursue PIF funds originates with General
Staff at the Major Command level. Local activity commanding
officers, comptrollers, and management engineering teams (METS)
are tasked to develop productivity investment fund submissions.
The irony of AFLC's participation in PIF is that aside from the
large dollar amount MILCON projects there is limited involvement
with other OSD productivity programs, e.g., FASCAP. Thus the
productivity initiative is somewhat specialized.
Projects are selected by MAJCOM staff based on historical
analysis of OSD funding of PIF. Factors are analyzed according
to knowledge of the current OSD budget and the payback periods,
IRR's, and manpower savings of projects funded in previous years.
As mentioned elsewhere, MILCON projects compare favorably on
these variables, and AFLC targets these projects to achieve a
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high selection rate.
Obligation rates are low at AFLC but the difficulties are
not unique to PIF. Funds are often received six months after the
start of the fiscal year leaving little time to complete
purchasing and acquisition during the fiscal year for which funds
are appropriated. MILCON projects have an additional source of
delay because construction planning must be coordinated with the
Regional Civil Engineering Authority. This adds to the
obligation time although Congress does allow additional
obligation time for military construction projects. To achieve
better obligation rates AFLC attempts to complete actions such as
preparing specifications and contracts prior to final obligation.
This facilitates the process but the rate remains low.
Accountability is managed by the local METs. PIAs are
required 180 days after installation. Manpower authorizations
are removed one year after installation.
Local Activity: Air Logistics Center, Sacramento (ALCS).
The Air Logistics Center, Sacramento at McClellan AFB is very
knowledgable about the PIF program. They hosted an AF Logistics
Command conference on productivity during the course of this
study which included productivity enhancing capital investment.
Yet, ALCS seldom applies for PIF monies. In part this is
attributed to the fact that ALCS does not perform production work
so there is not a free-flow of productivity ideas. However,
another important reason concerns manpower levels. At ACLS
assigned strength is greater than authorized strength so the
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perception of PECI is that capital investments would eliminate
positions now occupied by overstrength personnel. There is no
interest in taking these positions away from either the defense
managers or the jobholders. Generally, the procurement funds are
requested from sources other than the productivity investment
fund.
By way of illustration, ALCS is listed by OSD as receiving
funds in FY84 for a "Modal Analysis System." The project manager
had requested funds through two channels, one of which was PIF.
Funding was received from the alternate source and ALCS declined
the OSD funds. There were a variety of reasons for accepting the
alternate source: faster funding and installation, and no
manpower loss.
An accounting issue arises with this case because there
seems to be no clear record of the disposition of the OSD funds.
Air Logistics Center, Sacramento shows the funds were turned back
yet OSD shows the equipment was funded by PIF. The disposition
of the monies was not followed.
Major Command: Strategic Air Command (SAC)
Strategic Air Command has had moderate success with the PIF
program. Three of five projects were approved by OSD for FY 87-
88, but the dollar amount was small compared with other MAJCOMS.
The general feeling at SAC Headquarters is that certain features
of the productivity investment fund program act as disincentives
for program usage. The practices specifically mentioned are the
competition of military construction projects with other
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investment projects for PIF funds and the long time frame before
projects become operational.
The MILCON projects not only shrink the pool of money
available for productivity investment, but also major commands
lose control over funded MILCON projects. That is, when MILCON
projects are approved the monies are assigned to the regional
engineers, not the MAJCOM, and are no longer subject to MAJCOM
control. The MAJCOMS perceive it to be unfair for them to make
the front-end investment by positioning resources and not be able
to control the resource. Program managers at SAC strongly urged
that a separate productivity investment fund for MILCON fund be
established.
The time frame of PIF projects is also perceived as a
program disincentive. The originator of a project is usually
transferred before it becomes operational so there is little
project ownership. Furthermore, the two year PIF cycle makes
other productivity funds more attractive. For instance, a worthy
FASCAP project from a single activity was expanded to include a
dozen activities. Rather than combining the projects into a
single PIF submission each package was submitted through FASCAP.
This provided for a timely procurement which was not possible
with PIF.
Funding of PIF projects is also perceived as taking too much
time. Monies are usually not received until second quarter of
the fiscal year. Obligation usually occurs within the fiscal
year, but the acquisition and procurement process can be slow.
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The negative perceptions of the PIF program by SAC should be
weighed in light of their active involvement in productivity
investment through the FASCAP program. SAC is constantly a front
runner in FASCAP productivity projects. In FY87 SAC funded more
than 350 projects that accounted for over 30% of Air Force
projects. SAC has an active suggestion program. They
continually advertise for productivity ideas and cross-feed ideas
between activities. SAC has an obvious commitment to
productivity, but is reluctant to constrain productivity
investment within a two year planning and budgeting cycle. The
emphasis is on timely investments.
Local Activity: 2048th Wing Headquarters, Carswell AFB, TX.
The SAC Wing Headquarters at Carswell AFB uses FASCAP to fund
productivity investments. They submitted two PIF proposals for
FY87-88, but neither project was approved by OSD presumably
because the payback periods were over three years, and the
returns on investment were not competitive. There is a general
resistance at Wing Headquarters to both PIF and CSIP because of
the two year time frame so the tendency is to use FASCAP for
productivity investments.
Wing Headquarters has an effective advertising campaign to
generate productivity investment. Briefings are given to local
managers every six months using a well-executed slide
presentation. The base billboard and base newsletter are also
* used to inform personnel that FASCAP is available to fund
equipment.
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The MET team prepares documentation for first-time
requestors to train them in the paperwork. On subsequent
submissions the requestor is responsible for documentation.
Projects are usually justified through grade reductions or cost
avoidance. The general policy is to lower wage grade
requirements at one work center and apply the savings as an
upgrade of an unfunded requirement.
Accountability is handled by the MET team. Reports satisfy
the 180 day post-investment analysis requirement. The MET team
provides only enough justification to satisfy payback criteria,
so strict accounting is not required. For example, a reduction
in rating from E5 to E3 is all that is reported in a PIA, not
actual equipment usage.
Major Command: Military Airlift Command (MAC)
Military Airlift Command has little involvement with the PIF
program. They submitted only one proposal for FY 88-89 for $330K
which was approved by OSD. MAC devotes most of its productivity
resources to FASCAP with which they have extreme success. As
reported previously, one MAC Base received $1.5M in 18 months for
40 projects. The emphasis in MAC is to pursue monies that are
immediately available. FASCAP meets that objective; PIF does
not.
Local Activity: 22nd Air Force, Travis AFB. This activity
submits approximately 10 FASCAP projects per year. They actively
0publicize the program through the base newspaper, daily bulletins
and recognition certificates. They regularly brief local
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managers and also receive unqualified support from the Wing
Commander.
FASCAP is used for unfunded requirements which arise between
funding cycles. When a need is identified it is evaluated for
FASCAP funds. If a request is for previously authorized but non-
procured equipment FASCAP funding is inappropriate. Thus, FASCAP
is dedicated to capital investments which have been identified
since the last budget cycle.
Ironically, since FASCAP is used for nonstandard equipment
there are difficulties with contracting. As discussed previously
the Air Force requires stock numbers before contracting can
commence. Since productivity investments are often for new
equipment which has not been stocked, there is a protracted
discussion between the base and the supply depot before a stock
number is obtained. Consequently, obligations rates are low, and
there is frustration with the lack of coordination. In some
cases it has taken longer to purchase productivity items than
other items of similar value.
Major Command: Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) does not use the PECI program for
capital investment. The major impediment is a perception that
PECI funding would result in a manpower loss which PACAF can ill
afford. The manpower issue is twofold. First, the cmmand is
organized into small detachments. Second, PACAF does not have a
significant unfunded requirement to absorb manpower decrements.
The problem becomes one of scheduling resources. With small
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detachments, when a space is lost to a PECI investment, staffing
becomes an insoluble problem because there are no offsetting
unfunded requirements that would prevent the loss of a billet.
PACAF anticipates that manpower requirements will increase and
will become unfunded requirements against which PECI criteria can
be applied to fund capital investments. However, as of this







This research was undertaken to identify factors which
facilitate or impede full participation in the PIF portion of
OSD's PECI program. Research focused on the military departments
because of their substantial use of the program. Elements which
received in-depth examination were documentation, project
selection, funding, accountability, obligation and alternative
sources of productivity funds.
An overall description of factors which facilitate or impede
use of the PIF program is complicated. Two sets of variables
affect program usage: program maiagement and program elements.
Program management includes factors such as command interest as
well a user requirements, resources, and program knowledge.
There is wide variation both between and within the services on
these factors. The program elements of documentation, selection,
etc. also contains variables which affect PIF usage. The
complexity arises because of the multiple interactions between
program factors and management factors. There is neither a
single nor a simple interpretation of users perspectives of the
PIF program.
Program Management
The service differences in program management are very
clear-cut. Army has a large commitment to PIF, command support
is strong at all levels. Headquarters keeps the program visible
51
and smooths over rough spots. Personnel are available to
consult, educate, and generally assist users. Major commands are
also distinguished by the use of incentive programs (TRADOC) and
simplification of administration (AMC). Finally, local resource
managers market the program and provide consultation and training
in documentation. In short, Army has a fully integrated program
management so that PIF has "snowballed" into a significant
funding program.
Air Force receives far less funding from the Productivity
Investment Fund than Army, but the program is managed efficiently
with a balanced approach to all PECI funds. Air Force financial
managers seem very adept at analyzing OSD selection criteria and
documenting PIF projects to maximize funding; PIF is used most
often for MILCON projects. Air Force is also notable for using
CSIP to fund projects which are do not meet OSD criteria.
Finally, fast payback funds are centrally administered and tend
to be used by some commands to offset the long time period of
PIF. Thus, while the dollar amount of the Air Force PECI program
is modest, the program is managed for high effectiveness.
Navy participation in PIF is difficult to characterize.
While program usage is much smaller than Air Force or Army, a
head to head comparison is unfair because of the absence of
NAVMAT. The large users of PIF traditionally have been the
service materiel commands. When Navy disestablished this
command, there was a general halt to PIF participation;
regulations were no longer applicable, and program knowledge was
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disbursed. Disregarding NAVMAT, other management aspects affect
Navy participation. The program is spread across three different
offices which not only makes coordination difficult but also
diffuses program responsibility. The program is not well known
throughout the Navy, and users are untrained in technical aspects
of the program. In general Navy has a limited commitment to PIF.
It is interesting to contrast Navy program management with
the Marine Corps. Although the USMC seldom requests PIF funds,
program management is well defined. Responsibility is
centralized at Commandant, Marine Corps and implementation
instructions are explicit. Additionally, internal review
practices result in the most accurate accountability data of all
PECI participants.
Across the services a direct relationship is evident between
command interest and program involvement, and the higher the
command level expressing interest the greater the involvement.
Thus, the strength of Army's program is partly attributable to
the interest of the staff in the Office of the Comptroller. A
commitment to productivity by major commands and local activities
can also greatly influence PECI participation. The SPIRIT
program in TRADOC is a prime example of a major command
dedicating resources to productivity. Naval Aviation Depot,
Cherry Point stands out as a local activity that vigorously
pursues productivity.
A distinctive feature of the successful productivity
programs is the creative application of funding. The PECI
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program with its separate levels of funding is one of many tools
managers use to fund capital investments. Thus, a project that
competes favorably on OSD selection criteria may be submitted for
PIF, while another project may be broken up into smaller projects
to qualify for Fast Payback funds. Other projects may be
submitted through Asset Capitalization Program, Manufacturing
Technology, or other funding sources. As a general statement,
PIF is targeted to fund conservative rather than risky projects.
The trade-off between productivity and nature of the capital
investment generates considerable comment by program users. Some
argue that productivity is most enhanced through investment in
technologies which may be unproven at the time of purchase.
However, the risky nature of these investments is not amenable to
the fine grained economic analysis required by OSD. Thus, the
argument continues, the DPPO program is more a supplemental
funding source than a productivity fund. This explains why PIF
is often used to ease the strain on Other Procurement funds or to
supplement large MILCON projects authorized in the POM. It is
simply perceived as another source of funds that can be applied
against requirements, provided payback and investment ratios meet
OSD criteria.
Program Elements
PECI program elements which facilitate or impede utilization
are easier to explain than management variables, but the two sets
of variables are not independent. Management strategies are
influenced by program characteristics, and program deficiencies
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can be either intensified or eliminated through management
practices. With this caution in place the discussion
concentrates on specific elements of documentation, selection,
funding, obligation, accountability and alternate sources of
funding.
Documentation. Three areas of the documentation process
tend to negatively affect program use: time frame, preparation,
and justification. The time frame issue is the reluctance of
potential users to adopt the necessary two year time perspective
required for PIF proposals. The complaint most often expressed is
that personnel turnover makes project ownership difficult so
there is an absence of grass-roots level support for the program.
In successful programs the turnover problem is avoided by
periodic training by management resource personnel who emphasize
the benefits of funding large investments with PIF and underscore
the similarity of budgeting for PIF and budgeting for the POM.
Document preparation is a minor issue, which assumes greater
proportions with persons untrained in cost-benefit analysis. In
general, the complaint is that large project documentation
entails considerable overhead costs and dedication of resources.
Engineering activities tend to handle this problem by assigning
PIF projects to interns. In activities where administrative
support is unavailable, documentation can become a major irritant
with overhead costs taken out of current resources. When this
occurs project completion usually depends on the personal
dedication of a single individual. Respondents in this situation
55
reported discouragement and frustration. It was not possible to
ascertain how many worthwhile projects have slipped from view
because documentation was perceived as onerous, but it was almost
universally reported that the more frequently users worked with
the documentation, the easier the process became. It is clear
that training in cost-benefit analysis and document preparation
has a high payoff in program image as demonstrated by the Army
and Air Force productivity programs.
Project justification is an impediment to PECI use in a
roundabout fashion. Managers avoid funding capital investments
with PECI if the justification requires the elimination of actual
manpower billets. Projects are justified with hard savings
(e.g., reduction in energy costs), cost avoidance (e.g.,
reduction in pay grade), or applied against unfunded
requirements, but no instance was reported of a project that was
justified by the elimination of an occupied billet. At
activities where the number of assigned personnel was greater
than the number of authorized personnel, PECI was not considered
a suitable funding source for capital investment, and one
instance was reported where PECI funding was avoided because
justification would have eliminated two personnel spaces. Thus,
while the intent of PECI is to substitute capital for labor,
managers will not apply for PECI funds in situations where
occupied personnel spaces would be lost. It is erroneous to
* assume this resistance will disappear.
Selection. Selection issues which impede program
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utilization are generally related to OSD selection practices.
Managers are very knowledgeable of OSD's selection criteria and
practices and accordingly screen out projects that are unlikely
to be approved based on past experience. For example, the
permissable payback period is four years, but projects with
payback periods greater than two years are seldom funded. Thus,
Air Force and Army managers tend to discourage applications for
OSD funding for PIF-type projects with payback periods longer
than two years; however, worthwhile projects which may be
recommended for component-sponsored funds are not proposed for
OSD funding. As a general rule, if a project does not satisfy
past selection criteria, then local management resource personnel
will recommend against further action.
Another commonly voiced complaint is that the PIF criteria
favor MILCON projects to the detriment of Other Procurement and
RDTE projects. Generally, MILCON projects have such impressive
savings ratios that the competition is considered unfair. The
problem is compounded because high cost MILCON projects
drastically shrink the pool of funds available to other projects.
It has been suggested that PIF and MILCON be completely
disconnected and that a separate, OSD-sponsored competitive fund
be established for MILCON.
An ironic impediment to PIF utilization is competition with
PEIF. The fast payback capability of PEIF is extremely
attractive, and users will break up larger projects into smaller
component projects in order to qualify for PEIF. The extent of
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this practice is not known, but there were numerous suggestions
that dollar limits for PEIF be increased to $200K. In sum, it
appears that the high dollar threshold for PIF projects works
against program utilization because PEIF can satisfy requirements
with more immediacy.
Funding. Stability is the major issue with funding, but it
is uncertain whether this constitutes a barrier to utilization.
Undependable funding is everpresent with RDTE, and it is becoming
a critical problem for certain activities (e.g., Army Material
Command). The problem is that substantial cuts in RDTE by
Congress entail dilution of the remaining projects or even the
elimination of smaller projects. In the past shortfalls have
been covered with other resources, but as cuts increase less
coverage is available. The long term effects of these cuts are
uncertain, but the problem bears watching.
Doubt was frequently expressed about Congressional resolve
to continue the PECI program. Because of the climate of tight
money, e.g., Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, there is general skepticism
about the stability of productivity funds. Again, the result is
uncertainty.
An issue particular to the Army is the association of "cost-
sharing" with the PECI program. In the cost-sharing plan, hard
savings from Army investment funds, i.e., PECIP, are to be
accrued in an Army-wide revolving fund which will fund future
investment. Managers are concerned this will remove the
incentive for investment of savings within the command. The
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potential effect of a mental association of this plan with PECI
is that both will be viewed as a part of cost-sharing plan and
participation will decline.
The long term effect of this Army policy should not be
underestimated if Navy experience is an indicator. It may be a
coincidental occurrence but Navy PIF participation declined
dramatically following reprogramming of PIF monies. The delay in
receiving funds for authorized projects resulted in confusion and
disappointment with the PIF program. It is difficult to
reinstitute commitment to the program.
Obligation. Obligation is not a problem which solely
affects PECI; it is endemic with government procurement. An
area where obligation can present a problem for PECI is the
practice by some commands of pre-obligation of funds. If funds
become undependable, managers may be forced to scale back or
eliminate projects which have been primed for funding. If this
happens it is likely to result in resentment and distrust of the
PECI program. This has been only a minor problem as of this
report, but the emphasis on higher obligation rates coupled with
reduced funding makes this a more likely occurrence in the
future.
Accountability. Accountability is weak for the PECI
program. There are no accurate measures of savings. Each
military department has different accountability practices both
in how and when savings are measured. Some activities undercount
savings, while others report savings without actually determining
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equipment usage. Still other activities have such a long time
period before requiring reports that the individuals responsible
for the original project are no longer at the activity. The
seriousness of this problem should not be dismissed. GAO has
noted this as a problem area for DPPO.
Aside from these reporting problems, it is also extremely
difficult to trace monies in the PECI pipeline prior to
obligation. This is not a problem in every activity, but one
instance was encountered where funds were transmitted to an
activity and subsequently turned back. Yet, the funds were still
carried by DPPO as obligated monies. It is unknown whether this
is an isolated instance.
The departments are acting to remedy this deficiency and are
requiring quarterly reports on fund obligation. There are also
commands that are exemplary in their accounting practices (e.g.,
the Marines, Army Material Command and Air Force Management
Engineering Agency). In some commands, records have been
automated, so suspense files are available for obligations,
accounting, and other housekeeping duties. These procedures
should probably be adopted by all major commands.
Alternate Funds. Alternate sources of funding almost always
are preferred to PECI when other funds available. Funds without
justification requirements, competition, or accountability are
more desirable, as are funds which can be received in a short
time period. In general, most users are satisfied with PECI.
The exception is some Navy activities which find PECI onerous and
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This report was undertaken to evaluate elements of the
Productivity Investment Fund (PIF) of the Productivity
Enhancement Capital Investment (PECI) program. The explicit
objective of the PIF program is to improve productivity in the
activities of the Department of Defense through capital
investments that reduce labor costs. PIF funds are reserved by
SECDEF to fund capital investment projects costing more than
$100,000 and amortizing in less than four years. Funds are
awarded following competitive review of financial benefits by the
Defense Productivity Program Office (DPPO).
The research for this report concentrated on program
elements of documentation and project justification, selection
criteria, fund obligation, project accountability, and the
relation of the PIF to alternate sources of procurement funding.
Information was collected through interviews with program users
at the levels of department, major command, and local activity.
The research indicates that program users have varying
success with PIF depending on overall program knowledge and
financial management skills. For example, during the 1980's the
PIF funded modernization at the Army Laboratory Command (LABCOM)
largely as a result of the skills of the resource management
team. They were able to exempt laboratories from industrial
62
funding which enabled them to compete for the PIF. They also
submitted carefully prepared project documentation packages that
clearly defined financial benefits. The result of these efforts
is a history of favorable competition for the PIF so that this
single sub-command has received more PIF monies than entire
military departments.
A problematic feature of the PIF program is that the
selection criteria appear to favor inadvertently Military
Construction (MILCON) projects to the detriment of other
worthwhile capital investments. Life cycle savings figure
prominently in DPPO's selection equation. Since MILCON projects
have typical life cycles of 25 years and since the projects are
so costly, the life cycle savings ratio for MILCON projects far
exceeds the ratio for other types of capital investment projects.
This has a twin effect of depleting the PIF fund and diminishing
program interest for projects that may satisfy program criteria
but not meet selection criteria, as implemented.
The weakest part of the PIF program is the uneven
implementation of accountability requirements by the military
departments so there are no accurate ex post measures of
productivity savings. Post investment analysis is required after
* installation of PIF funded capital investments, but there is wide
variability in reporting this information. Some activities
monitor equipment usage every six months until payback is
* achieved, some activities undercount savings, others report
savings without actually determining equipment usage, and other
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activities wait two years before requiring information. There is
no consistency to post investment analysis; consequently, reports
of productivity savings are loose estimates. This is a
deficiency which needs correction.
Overall, the Productivity Investment Fund has been
beneficial to the Department of Defense. The fund has enabled
managers to relax capital constraints and modernize the defense
industry without increasing the requirement for other scarce
resources, such as manpower. While some hard savings have
accrued from the PIF program, most savings have been applied
against unfunded requirements. In this fashion defense managers
have been able to keep pace with increased output demands without
requiring additional manpower. In the tight resource environment
currently experienced in DoD, the PIF program is perceived as a
valuable resource that enables commanders to supplement
constrained procurement budgets. The PIF program is a useful and
valuable program with only minor deficiencies which can be
corrected with slight adjustments.
Specific recommendations offered to the Defense Program
Productivity Office are the following:
-Publish selection criteria as part of DoD Directive 5010.36
so that resource managers can easily evaluate the
probability of receiving PIF funding for a project.
Currently, knowledgeable managers develop this information
* based on past decisions by DPPO. It would greatly simplify




-Revise DoD Directive 5010.36 so that post-investment
analysis is standardized across the service departments and
the information is routinely available to DPPO. Without
standard mgasures it will remain impossible to evaluate the
productivity impact of projects funded among the various
departments.
-MILCON projects should be separated from the PIF. They
receive a disproportionate share of available funds because
of their favorable competitive ratios which ultimately
dilutes the effectiveness of the program. If MILCON
projects are to continue in this fund, they should be
subject to a separate evaluation to equalize the selection
criteria across project types.
A separate recommendation is offered to the Navy to
centralize PIF responsibility in a single office. As the program
is now structured, PIF is spread across three different
management functions of operations, comptroller, and logistics.
This tends to create confusion for program control and
responsibility which is not alleviated by coordination between
the functions. Based on the other services success with a
centralized PIF program, the Navy would likely benefit from a
similar approach.
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